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Abstract 
Capital accumulation can modify the relative productivity between skilled and unskilled workers, 
leading to changes in the wage structure. In particular, if capital goods are relatively more 
complementary to skilled workers, a positive correlation between investment in physical capital 
and the wage premium would be expected. In this paper, we present evidence for this hypothesis 
by taking advantage of the variability in wage premia and capital investment across industries in 
the Argentina’s manufacturing sector. We conclude that the wage premium for skilled workers 
increased more in those industries with higher investment in machinery and equipment. The 
overall evidence seems to indicate that industry affiliation is an important determinant of 
earnings differentials by skill group.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Investment in machinery and equipment can affect the wage premium for skilled workers 
through at least two channels. First, capital goods are usually believed to be skill-complementary 
(see Krusell et al., 2000, among others). Consequently, higher rates of capital investment should 
increase the relative productivity of skilled workers. Second, new machinery and equipment may 
incorporate skill-biased technological innovations. The empirical literature suggests that capital 
accumulation and technological change are the main reasons behind the observed rising skill 
premium in many developed countries. 
This paper is aimed at providing empirical evidence on the link between capital investment 
and rising wage inequality in Argentina, the Latin American country that has experienced the 
largest increase in inequality since the early 1990s (World Bank, 2004) and for which the speed 
and depth of economic reforms were among the largest in the region (Lora, 1997; Behrman et al., 
2001). Between 1992 and 2001, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of household per capita 
income climbed from 0.450 to 0.522, while the Gini for the distribution of hourly wages 
increased from 0.400 to 0.445 (CEDLAS, 2006). During the same period, the Argentinean 
economy experienced strong capital accumulation and technological change. Foreign Direct 
Investment grew 11.2% annually between 1991 and 2000, while Fixed Gross Investment in 
machinery and equipment increased 6.8% per year during the same period. These figures are in 
sharp contrast to the negative values of the previous decade. In the 1990s, encouraged by a novel 
framework of macroeconomic stability, privatization, deregulation, and trade and financial 
liberalization, many firms strongly invested in physical capital and adopted new technologies. 
The intensity of this process was not uniform across economic sectors. In some industries, 
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investment merely replaced depreciated capital stock (e.g., leather and footwear), while in others 
net investment in machinery and equipment was strong (e.g., chemicals and petrochemicals).  
This paper assesses the effect of capital accumulation on the observed wage gap between 
skilled and unskilled workers in the manufacturing sector in Argentina. The existing literature on 
the determinants of the rising wage premia in that Latin American country is limited to a study by 
Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003). They conclude that wage differences between skilled and 
unskilled workers in manufacturing sectors in Greater Buenos Aires increased more in industries 
with higher import penetration (explaining roughly 10% of the total wage gap increase). In 
contrast, other studies on Latin American countries—Attanasio et al. (2004) in the case of 
Colombia and Pavcnik et al. (2004) for Brazil—find no significant impact of trade liberalization 
on industry-specific skill premia. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides evidence of the relationship 
between capital investment and skill premium in Latin America. Related studies include Pavcnik 
(2003), who presents evidence on the complementary relationship between skill-upgrading and 
the adoption of new technologies at the plant level in Chile, and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005), 
who relate gross capital accumulation levels to industry rents in Colombia. Neither study finds a 
significant impact of investment (as opposed to trade exposure) on industry-specific skill premia. 
Other studies in Latin America suggest that technological progress could be behind the increase 
in wage inequality in the region, although they arrive at this conclusion indirectly (Behrman et 
al., 2001; Sánchez-Páramo and Schady, 2003). 
In this paper, we present evidence for the relationship between capital accumulation and the 
wage structure by taking advantage of the variability in wage premia and capital investment 
across industries in Argentina’s manufacturing sector. We use repeated cross-sectional data from 
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the Permanent Household Survey (EPH) between 1991 and 2001, as well as official data on 
import penetration, exports, and investment in machinery and equipment in manufacturing sectors 
(see the Appendix for a detailed description of the data). Our results suggest that in sectors in 
which capital accumulation has been more intense, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled 
workers has significantly widened. Although we are unable to identify causal effects, we take the 
results as preliminary evidence for the major impact of capital accumulation on wage inequality 
in the manufacturing sector of Argentina.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the evolution of 
wages and employment by educational group in Argentina. Section III is a brief review of some 
theoretical arguments linking physical capital to the wage structure. Section IV shows the results 
at the industry level of the links between capital accumulation and industry-specific skill premia, 
while section V contains a similar analysis, but at the individual level. The paper concludes with 
some brief comments in section VI. 
 
II. Wages and employment  
 
Wage inequality substantially increased in Argentina during the 1990s, compared to previous 
decades.1 Figure 1 shows real hourly wages for workers between 18 and 65 years of age in 
Greater Buenos Aires (GBA), the main urban area of Argentina (34% of total population).2 The 
figure shows the evolution of real hourly wages for the median worker and those located at the 
90th and 10th percentiles. The wage gap between these two percentiles shrunk during the 1980s, 
mainly due to decreasing real wages for individuals at the top of the distribution, and widened 
                                                 
1 See Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003), Gasparini (2003), and CEDLAS (2006).  
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between 1991 and 2001. In that period, while the median hourly wage increased 4%, real wages 
increased 31% for workers at the 90th percentile, and fell 15% for workers at the 10th percentile.   
This paper is aimed at exploring changes in wages by skill group. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the wage premia for skilled workers (defined as those with at least a high school 
degree) for the period 1985-2001 in Greater Buenos Aires, both across all sectors in the economy 
and only in the manufacturing sector (20% average employment share during this period). The 
skill premium for each year is calculated by regressing the logarithm of hourly wage of the main 
occupation on a high school graduation indicator, along with other controls such as age, age 
squared, and gender (population weights considered). The skill premium declined until 1993, 
from where it started an ascending path, and returns to high school graduation increased by 48% 
between 1993 and 2001 in the manufacturing sector (47% for the whole economy). Changes for 
the rest of the urban areas also have been significant, although milder; the skill premium rose 
15% in the manufacturing sector and 27% in the economy.  
If each skill group is homogeneous and the labor market adjusts quickly, the wage gap 
between the skilled and the unskilled should not differ across economic sectors. Instead, with 
unobservable heterogeneity and high adjustment costs, industry differences in the wage structure 
could persist for a long period of time (Hamermesh, 1993).3 We compute the sector-specific skill 
premium by means of the following specification: 
ijtjtijtijtIijtXijtijt SPSIIXw εββ +++= *)*()ln(                                   (1) 
where wijt is the hourly wage of individual i working in industry j at time t, Xijt is a vector of 
workers’ characteristics (age, age squared, gender, and regional indicators), Iijt is a set of industry 
                                                                                                                                                              
2 GBA is one of the few regions for which household survey data prior to 1991 is available. 
3 Heckman and Pages-Serra (2000) present evidence that labor market regulations in Latin America significantly 
obstruct labor mobility across sectors. 
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indicators, and Sijt is an indicator for whether worker i in industry j at time t is skilled (has a high 
school degree). The coefficients SPjt are the sector-specific skill premia, representing the 
additional wage skilled workers earn in a given industry at time t, compared to the base wage 
received for both skilled and unskilled workers in each industry.  
The first column in Table 1 shows the set of relative industry-specific skill premia for the 
year 1991 in all urban areas with household survey coverage (see Appendix). These are 
calculated setting the omitted industry-specific skill premium to zero and then expressed as 
deviations from the employment-weighted average skill premium (Krueger and Summer, 1988). 
Each value represents the proportional wage difference through an industry-specific skill 
premium for a skilled worker in a given industry relative to the average skilled worker in the 
economy with the same observable characteristics. Table 1 confirms the existence of substantial 
differences in skill premium levels and changes across manufacturing sectors in Argentina.  
Changes in wage differentials by educational levels could be attributed to supply-side 
factors, such as changes in the scarcity of educated workers. The hypothesis of rising wage 
inequality due to the falling relative supply of skilled workers seems implausible in Argentina. 
The proportion of 18- to 65 year-old individuals with a high school degree in Greater Buenos 
Aires jumped from 26% in 1985 to 46% in 2001. In all of urban Argentina, the change was 
similar—from 37% in 1991 to 46% in 2001.4 Table 2 shows that the national employment share 
of skilled workers increased in every industry during the 1990s. In 1991, 28% of manufacturing 
workers were skilled, and that share climbed to 43% in 2001. 
In summary, during the 1990s, Argentina witnessed a significant growth in the labor supply 
and employment of skilled individuals, along with a substantial increase in the wage premia to 
                                                 
4 According to Census data, migrations were not significant in the period under analysis.   
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these workers, which suggests strong changes in the relative labor demands. In sections IV and V, 
we exploit the variability in relative wages across industries in order to relate changes in wage 
premia to demand-shift explanations. But first, in the next section, we briefly present a theoretical 
argument linking the wage premia to capital investment.  
  
III. Capital investment, technology, and wages  
 
One of the arguments to explain rising wage inequality relies on physical capital investments. 
If machines and equipment are skilled-complementary, an increase in capital utilization levels 
should lead to an increase in the relative productivity of skilled workers and, consequently, a rise 
in the wage premia. Following Krusell et al. (2000), we propose an illustrative model with 
implications for the changes in industry-specific skill premia. Assume that firms within a specific 
sector n produce q units with a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) technology, and three 
inputs: capital (k), skilled workers (ls), and unskilled workers (lu), expressed in terms of efficiency 
units. To simplify the analysis, assume also that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and 
unskilled workers is equal to the elasticity of substitution between unskilled workers and capital.5   
    ( ) nnnnnn sntsntnntnnuntuntnnt hkhq σρσρρσ ψλλθψθ
1
))(1()1()( ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+−+=            (2) 
 
Each labor input is the product of worked hours (h) and an efficiency index. For skilled 
workers, ls=ψshs, while for the unskilled lu=ψuhu. θ and λ represent the factor shares, while σ and 
ρ (both less than 1) determine the elasticity of substitution between inputs. Specifically, the 
                                                 
5 See Hammeresh (1993) and Goldin and Katz (1998) for a discussion of this assumption. 
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elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labor is δ=1/(1-σ), which is also equal (by 
assumption) to the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. The elasticity 
of substitution between capital and skilled labor is γ=1/(1-ρ). A higher complementarity between 
capital and skilled labor, compared to the complementarity between capital and unskilled labor, 
requires that σ be greater than ρ. 
From equation (2) and assuming that wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor, 
the skill premium πnt (the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled workers) for sector n at time t 
can be written as: 
 
                    ( )
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Taking logs, differentiating (3) with respect to time, and denoting the rate of growth of the 
variable x as gx, yields: 
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According to equation (4), the change in the skill premium can be divided into three 
components. The first represents the relative change in factor endowments (ghst - ghut): the higher 
the relative rate of growth of skilled labor, the smaller the wage premia (as σ < 1). The second 
component captures the growth in the relative efficiency among educational groups. If σ > 0, an 
increase in the relative efficiency of skilled workers generates an increase in the skill premium. 
Finally, the third term measures what Krusell et al. (2000) call the “complementary effect.” As 
previously mentioned, if σ is greater than ρ, then capital is more skill-complementary. In this 
case, higher investment in machinery and equipment would increase the skill premium.  
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Even when capital is not skill-complementary, higher capital accumulation levels could 
increase the skill premium π. If new capital goods incorporate imbedded technological change, an 
increase in investment in new machinery and equipment can accelerate the adoption of new 
technologies. Incorporation of capital associated with new technologies (e.g., computers and 
information technology) can increase skilled workers’ relative efficiency, thus generating a rise in 
the skill wage gap.  
In equation (4), capital incorporation associated with new technologies would increase 
skilled workers’ relative efficiency through the second term of the equation (gψst - gψut). Many 
authors share the view that skill-biased technological change is the main factor behind the 
observed changes in the wage structure in developed countries in the last few decades.6 If skill-
biased technologies developed in the North are transmitted to the South, we would expect 
industries that invest heavily in foreign capital goods to have a higher increase in skill premium 
through the increase in the relative efficiency of skilled workers. Some recent papers suggest that 
skill-biased technological change can be transferred through trade, in particular through imports 
with high R&D content (Attanasio et al., 2004; Pavcnik et al., 2004; Sánchez-Páramo and 
Schady, 2004). 
Of course, there are other factors that can affect the wage structure that are not being 
considered in equation (4). In particular, two have been extensively studied in the economic 
literature: labor institutions and international trade. The declining power of unions and the 
reduction in the minimum wage may have negatively affected unskilled workers’ wages. Unions 
tend to reduce the wage gap through collective bargaining, compressing the distribution of 
                                                 
6 See Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999), Autor et al. (1998), Autor et al. (2001), Acemoglu (2002), and Autor et al. (2006) for evidence in favor of 
SBTC as the main force behind the rise in wage inequality in the US. Card and DiNardo (2002) challenge this 
hypothesis. 
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earnings. If these institutions lose power, the force that prevents a reduction in the relative wages 
of the low-skilled workers weakens (see DiNardo et al., 1996). Economic theory also predicts 
changes in the wage structure caused by changes in international trade. According to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, if tariff reductions are proportionally larger in sectors employing relatively 
more unskilled workers, these workers will experience a decline in their relative wages.7 
In principle, the three explanations—capital accumulation, trade liberalization, and declining 
union power—could apply to the Argentinean case. First, there is some evidence of the decline of 
union membership in Argentina. Sánchez-Páramo and Schady (2004) report a fall in union 
density from 27.4% in the 1980s to 24.6% in 1995/99. 
Second, Argentina witnessed strong physical capital incorporation during the 1990s (Acosta 
and Loza, 2005). Foreign Direct Investment increased at an annual growth rate of 11.2% between 
1991 and 2000, and Fixed Gross Investment in machinery and, during the same period, 
equipment grew at 6.8% per year. The relative price of capital goods declined 10% between 1993 
and 2000, with respect to other manufacturing goods, presumably due to the real exchange rate 
appreciation and tariff reductions. The largest import tariff reductions were implemented in 
durable goods, machinery, and transport equipment, from an average of 60% in 1988, to 23% in 
1991, and 12% in 1993 (Berlinski, 2003). These changes, together with a more favorable business 
environment for investment, generated a significant increase in the capital stock, particularly of 
imported machinery and equipment. FIEL (2002) estimates that the physical capital stock 
(excluding the public sector) grew by 20% between 1992 and 1999.  
Tariff reductions were not limited to capital goods. Trade liberalization started gradually by 
the end of the 1980s and was extended to almost all sectors in the economy during the 1990s. 
                                                 
7 See Wood (1994), Leamer (1995), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), and Attanasio et al. (2004). 
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Berlinski (2003) reports that, in most manufacturing sectors, tariffs declined in the 1990s from a 
weighted average of 48% in 1988 to 16% in 1997. Changes in trade policy also included the end 
of sector-specific subsides with protectionist goals, the elimination of most non-tariff barriers, 
and a commercial agreement with neighbor countries (Mercosur).  
 
IV. Industry-Specific Skill Premium, Capital, and Trade Exposure 
 
Neither physical capital accumulation nor changes in international trade (and, presumably, in 
unionization rates) have occurred with the same intensity across industries. In this section, we 
exploit the variability in capital investment and import penetration across industries in order to 
associate these phenomena to changes in the wage structure. It is important to point out from the 
start that it is difficult to explain differences in capital accumulation paths adopted by 
manufacturing industries in Argentina with the data at hand. If, as we presume, differences in the 
intensity of capital investment in the 1990s were mainly driven by factors not correlated with skill 
premium changes (e.g., differences in the distance to the technological frontier after a decade—
the 1980s—without investments or differential capital tax treatments), then our results can be 
interpreted as preliminary evidence of the causal effect of capital accumulation over the wage 
structure. If, instead, other underlying factors were driving both capital investment and wages, the 
results of this paper are just empirical evidence of the strength of the correlations between these 
variables.  
There is little information on capital and technology by sector in Argentina or on the R&D 
content of imports. We take advantage of the fact that the Argentina’s Secretary of Industry 
released estimates on machinery and equipment gross investments in manufacturing sectors for 
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the period 1990-2001, based on firm surveys (see Appendix for data sources). We normalize this 
variable using sectoral gross value-added (GVA) to get a proper capital accumulation measure. 
This indicator has some limitations. It is restricted to the manufacturing sector and captures gross 
investment, instead of capital stock or net investment. Additionally, the indicator does not 
identify whether the new machines incorporate new technology, so we cannot distinguish 
between technological change and pure capital accumulation effects (second and third terms in 
equation 4).  
The last three columns in Table 1 show investment in machinery and equipment, import 
penetration, and exports for the period 1991-2001 (as a share of accumulated gross value added). 
The classification into 14 manufacturing sectors (as opposed to the 22 sectors’ standard two-digit 
ISIC) is due to two reasons: (a) in Argentina, official statistics on capital accumulation are broken 
down in 17 sectors; and (b) three of these 17 sectors have small employment shares (less than 
1%) in the manufacturing sector and are therefore merged into other similar product categories.   
The simple linear correlation of changes in capital accumulation and in the skill wage premia 
between 1991 and 2001 is 0.193. When we pool all industries and years in the sample (14 
industries x 11 years), changes in skill premium are weakly correlated with changes in investment 
in machinery and equipment (0.107), negligibly correlated with changes in import penetration 
(0.036), and negatively correlated with export ratios (-0.089). 
To evaluate the determinants of industry-specific skill premia, we start with a reduced-form 
specification at the industry level (see Attanasio et al., 2004, and Pavcnik et al., 2004): 
jtIjTtXjtMjtKjtjt ITXMKSP µβββββ +++++=                                 (5) 
 Industry skill premia (SPjt) are pooled over time t and regressed on a vector of investment in 
machinery and equipment (Kjt) and import penetration (Mjt), both normalized over gross value 
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added and expressed in logarithms. A vector of additional control variables (Xjt) captures other 
observable time-varying industry factors, such as exports (as a share of GVA), and the 
skilled/unskilled and male/female employment ratios. The vectors Tt and Ij are the sets of year 
and industry indicators. To account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the error term 
(µjt), robust Huber-White standard errors are computed, clustered at the industry level. We also 
estimate equation (5) in first differences. Following Krueger and Summers (1988), each sector-
year observation is weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the sectorial skill premium 
(using the standard error of the intercept for the omitted sector).8 The coefficients on capital 
accumulation and import penetration should not be capturing industry differences in worker 
composition correlated with investment decisions or trade protection policies, as in order to 
construct industry-specific skill premia we had to first control for worker characteristics. 
Similarly, as suggested in Pavcnik et al. (2004), because returns to worker characteristics are 
allowed to differ year by year in the computation of skill premia, all economy-wide changes in 
returns to worker characteristics associated with changes in labor supply over time are already 
taken into account. 
Table 3 presents the results for the models of skill premium in levels (columns 1 to 6) and 
first differences (columns 7 and 8). The numbers in the first column suggest that capital 
investment levels are positively and significantly correlated with skill premium at the industry 
level. Of course, other controls need to be taken into account. The second column, for instance, 
                                                 
8 Assigning equal weights to every sector each year does not alter significantly the results presented in Table 3.  
Attanasio et al. (2004), and Pavcnik et al. (2004) follow Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997) two-step restricted 
least squares procedure for the calculation of the exact standard errors of the sectorial skill premia after using 
Krueger and Summers (1988) normalization. However, as suggested in Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997), the 
gains from using the exact formulation are minimum when industry differences are calculated using large samples 
(i.e., household survey data).   
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introduces import penetration ratios as a means to determine whether they also have an influence 
on the wage structure. While capital accumulation remains significant, there is no impact from 
the import penetration variable.  
Other time-varying industry characteristics may affect the wage structure. Although 
presumably posing endogeneity concerns, columns 3 to 6 add export ratios and skilled/unskilled 
and male/female employment ratios as control variables. For instance, workers with different 
educational levels (or gender) might differ in their ability to bargain over wages. Indeed, Revenga 
(1997) finds that, in Mexico, the higher the proportion of unskilled workers in a given sector, the 
lower their ability to capture industry rents. Table 3 shows that all control variables are non-
significant. Adding controls does not substantially change the main result of the effect of capital 
investment on the skill wage premia.  
As discussed above, differences in capital investment across industries may not be 
exogenous. Some unobserved factors could potentially cause some industries to simultaneously 
increase investments in physical capital and bid up the wage of skilled workers. A higher skill 
premium could have been caused by an unobserved demand shifter (e.g., technological change), 
with industries increasing both physical capital and skilled labor at the same time in order to 
increase output. If this is the case, the evidence would still suggest that skilled labor and physical 
capital are complements in production in these industries, but this does not mean that capital 
accumulation was the cause of rising skill premia. This endogeneity concern also can apply to the 
case of import penetration and exports, as trade flows depend on factor costs. 
In the absence of reliable instruments, it is difficult to overcome this causality problem. To 
somehow alleviate it, capital accumulation, import penetration, and export ratios are lagged one 
period in column 5. Of course, the endogeneity problem would still remain under adjustment 
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costs to capital, as firms would prefer to smoothly increase capital stock over time. Using lagged 
right-hand-side variables addresses an additional concern: the effect of capital investment on 
relative labor productivity may not be contemporaneous. The results in column 5 are similar to 
those in column 3. The coefficient on capital accumulation is a little lower (0.027) than the one 
for the contemporaneous case (0.034).  
Other time-invariant characteristics at the industry level could be correlated with capital 
investment and the wage structure. To take that into account in column 6, we add sector fixed 
effects. The coefficient of capital accumulation is reduced to half (0.015), but it is still significant 
at the 5% level. Even by controlling for specific characteristics at the industry level, the main 
result of interest remains significant. 
Columns 7 and 8 present the regression specification in first differences. Changes in 
investment in machinery and equipment have a positive and significant effect on changes in 
sector skill premia. In contrast, changes in import penetration and export ratios are not 
significantly correlated with changes in wage differentials by educational level. The addition of 
other controls does not affect this result.  
In summary, at the industry level, capital accumulation seems to be positively and 
significantly correlated with relative wages for skilled workers. In contrast, trade exposure does 
not appear to be related to changes in the skill premium. The next section assesses whether this 
result remains valid when looking at individual-level data in a traditional wage equation. 
 
V. Evidence at the Individual Level 
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In this section, we extend the methodology to take advantage of household survey data at the 
individual level. The equation to be estimated is an individual-level Mincer-type semi-log wage 
regression. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the real hourly wage of the main 
occupation, which is regressed on variables that interact the individual educational level with 
sector specific capital accumulation and import penetration variables. Specifically: 
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where wi is individual i’s hourly wage in his or her main activity. For simplicity, in the notation, 
we ignore the rest of the subscripts. Each individual i has associated an industry j where he or she 
works, a city c where he or she lives, and a time period t in which he or she was interviewed by 
the household survey. We consider three educational groups: without a high-school degree (g = 
1), high-school graduates ( g= 2), and college graduates ( g= 3). Eg is the indicator variable for 
educational level g. The contributions of this model, compared to a typical wage equation, are 
included in the second and third terms of equation (6). The variable mi (ki) denotes the logarithm 
of import penetration (capital accumulation) over gross value added for the sector where 
individual i worked in year t. As these variables interact with educational dummies, the model 
allows import penetration and capital accumulation to have differential effects by skill. The 
regression also includes control variables (Zi) at the individual level (gender, age). The estimated 
coefficients for the educational dummies and for control variables Z are allowed to vary by year 
(Ti is the set of year dummies). Finally, equation (6) includes time (T), industry (R), and city (C) 
fixed effects. 
The interpretation of the coefficients βm and βk is as follows: consider two individuals 
labeled as s and u, only differing in their educational level, whereby s is a college graduate, while 
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u does not have a high-school degree. From equation (6) and denoting with a “hat” the estimated 
value of the coefficients, 
                         ( ) ( ) ( ) skksmmEtEtus kmww 232323 ˆˆˆˆˆˆˆlnˆln ββββββ −+−+−=−                               (7) 
where ms = mu and ks = ku, since both individuals work in the same sector. The wage premia is the 
sum of three terms: the traditional one and those capturing the effects of import penetration and 
capital accumulation. Based on the discussion in section III, all three differences are expected to 
be positive.  
Equation (6) is estimated for individuals aged 18 to 65, with positive wage earnings and 
working in the manufacturing sector between 1991 and 2001. This part of the analysis resembles 
Galiani and Sanguinetti’s (2003) study. We extend their paper in two directions: (i) expanding the 
geographical analysis to most of the urban areas in Argentina (and therefore substantially 
increasing the sample size) and, more importantly, (ii) evaluating an additional source of 
differences in the observed wage gaps by sector—capital accumulation. 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (6) using weighted least squares. For 
simplicity, we exclude the estimated coefficients for the control variables. The first column starts 
by looking at capital accumulation coefficients. Investment in machinery and equipment is 
positively correlated with the wage gaps by skill level. An additional 1% investment in machinery 
and equipment (as a share of gross value added) is associated with a 3.3% increase in the wage 
gap between college graduates and high-school dropouts. Column 2 adds import penetration by 
sector; no significant association between this variable and the wage gap is found.9 The results do 
                                                 
9 Galiani and Sanguinetti (2003) find for the Greater Buenos Aires area in the period 1992-1999 that an increase in 
import penetration widens the wage gap between skilled workers and the rest. We are able to get significant impacts 
of import penetration ratios using their specification and data coverage, although they are of minor order compared to 
capital accumulation effects. As in our case, in their study, import penetration ratios do not significantly alter the 
wage gap between medium- and low-skilled groups. 
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not vary in column 3, where we control for export ratios. Similarly, results do not significantly 
change when capital accumulation, import, and export ratios are introduced lagged one and two 
periods, respectively (see columns 4 and 5). 
As discussed above, we interpret these results as preliminary evidence of the importance that 
investment in machinery and equipment had in shaping the wage structure in Argentina during 
the 1990s. Of course other explanations are possible. One may argue, for instance, that high-
investment sectors are presumably more likely to be the ones having higher profits. In the 
presence of rent sharing in wage determination, the estimates reported may be capturing a rent 
sharing advantage of skilled workers in those sectors (Revenga, 1997). It is difficult to 
disentangle this effect in the absence of data on wage compensation practices, although it is 
widely cited in the literature of compensations that rent sharing practices are less common in 
developing countries. 
 
V. Final comments 
 
Capital accumulation can increase the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers if 
capital is skill-complementary, and if it has incorporated skilled-biased technological change. The 
evidence for developed countries indicates that this phenomenon is important in accounting for 
the observed increase in the wage premia during the last decades. Argentina seems to have 
adopted these results as a consequence of the accelerated capital incorporation process that 
occurred during the 1990s.  
Combining cross-sectional microdata from a household survey with aggregate data on capital 
accumulation and import penetration for different manufacturing industries, the paper suggests 
 18
that higher investment in machinery and equipment in a particular industry is associated with an 
increase in the wage premia for skilled workers in that industry. The investment effect seems to 
have been substantially larger than the trade exposure effect. 
Of course, other unobserved industry and time-varying factors correlated with both capital 
accumulation and returns to education could be playing a role, posing identification problems. 
Even though the main results hold after considering lagged values of the variables of interest, 
causality interpretations should be made with caution in absence of good instrumental variables.  
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 Appendix: Data Sources 
 
Labor Force Data 
 
Labor market data comes from Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH), the nationally 
representative household survey of Argentina. For the period 1991-2001 repeated cross sectional 
data is available, covering 28 urban areas: Buenos Aires, Greater Buenos Aires, Bahia Blanca, 
Catamarca, Comodoro Rivadavia, Cordoba, Corrientes, Formosa, Jujuy, La Plata, La Rioja, Mar 
del Plata, Mendoza, Neuquen, Parana, Posadas, Resistencia, Rio Cuarto, Rio Gallegos, Rosario, 
Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Fe, Santa Rosa, Santiago del Estero, Tierra del Fuego, and 
Tucuman. These areas account for nearly two-thirds of the total country’s population. 
The analysis is restricted to the manufacturing sector, and to 18-65 years old individuals (males 
and females) with positive earnings. The wage measure is the hourly wage of the main 
occupation, deflated by the monthly national consumer price index (expressed in 1999 pesos). 
The main education indicator is completed years of schooling: workers are classified into (i) 
those with no high-school degree, (ii) with at most a high-school degree, and (iii) with a 
university degree. Primary education in Argentina consists of seven years of schooling, while 
secondary education comprises five years of schooling. 
 
Capital Accumulation Data 
 
Data on machinery and equipment gross investment by manufacturing sector (at current prices) 
comes from the local Secretary of Industry (Base de Inversiones, Centro de Estudios para la 
Produccion, Secretaria de Industria, Comercio y PyME, Ministerio de Economia y Producción, 
www.cep.gov.ar). Estimates of capital accumulation by sector, based on firm surveys, are 
available for the period 1990-2001. 
Unfortunately, the Secretary of Industry does not classify sectors using the 22 sector’s standard 
two-digit ISIC. 17 ISIC sectors can be matched from the Secretary of Industry’s classification, 
although three of them are merged into other similar product categories, as they have small 
 23
employment shares. The 14 sectors considered in the analysis are: Food, Beverages and Tobacco; 
Textiles and Clothing; Leather and Footwear; Wood and Furniture; Paper; Publishing and 
Printing; Chemicals and Petrochemicals; Plastics and Rubber Products; Non-metallic Mineral 
Products; Basic Metallic Products; Fabricated Metallic Products; Machinery and Equipment; 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment; and Transportation Vehicles.   
 
Trade Exposure Data 
 
Data on imports and exports by manufacturing sector (at current prices) comes from the Institute 
for the Integration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), at the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB). The two-digit ISIC classification was matched into the 14 sectors 
used for the capital accumulation measures. 
 
Gross Value Added Data 
 
Gross Value Added (at current prices) by manufacturing sector (at two-digit ISIC classification) 
is available at the local statistical agency (INDEC, Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 
www.indec.mecon.gov.ar). The two-digit ISIC classification was matched into the 14 sectors 
used for the capital accumulation measures. The sectorial capital accumulation and import 
penetration measures are normalized using Gross Value Added in order to account for the size of 
each manufacturing sector. 
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 Figure 1: Hourly Wages 
Selected Percentiles, All Sectors  
Greater Buenos Aires, 1985-2001 
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Source: Own calculations based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH), October round.   
Note 1: Real wages in 1999 pesos (deflated by CPI).  
Note 2: The vertical line at year 1991 indicates the beginning of most of the economic reforms.  
Note 3: Years 1988 and 1989 (hyperinflation) were deleted from the figure.  
 
 25
Figure 2: Returns to High-School Graduation 
Greater Buenos Aires, 1985-2001 
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                             Source: Own calculations based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH), October round.   
Note 1: The skill premium for each year is calculated by regressing the logarithm of hourly 
wage of the main occupation on a high school graduation indicator, along with other controls 
such as age, age squared, and gender (population weights considered). 
Note 2: The vertical line at year 1991 indicates the beginning of most of the economic reforms.  
Note 3: Years 1988 and 1989 (hyperinflation) were deleted from the figure.  
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Table 1  
Relative Skill Premium, Investment in Machinery and Equipment, Import Penetration, and Exports 
by Manufacturing Sector 
Argentina, 1991-2001 
Relative Relative Investment M&E / GVA Imports / GVA Exports / GVA
Skill Premium Skill Premium Accumulated Accumulated Accumulated
Level, 1991 Change 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001 1991-2001
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.16 -0.12 2.7 2.8 22.1
Textiles and clothing 0.03 -0.24 0.9 13.7 6.8
Leather and footwear -0.30 0.11 0.8 10.4 42.3
Wood and furniture -0.26 -0.01 7.3 38.6 21.0
Paper 0.43 -0.28 5.0 22.5 6.8
Publishing and printing -0.17 0.25 0.9 8.5 3.5
Chemicals and petrochemicals 0.16 0.12 6.6 23.9 13.5
Plastics and rubber products -0.07 0.12 2.4 24.3 6.9
Non-metalilc mineral products 0.04 0.71 8.3 10.0 3.9
Basic metallic products -0.05 0.46 3.1 18.9 21.7
Fabricated metallic products -0.07 0.04 0.7 19.2 4.4
Machinery and equipment 0.16 -0.29 1.4 118.7 15.9
Electrical and electronic equipment -0.08 0.08 1.2 99.8 8.0
Transportation Vehicles -0.08 -0.07 11.0 49.7 24.8
Correlation with changes in skill premium 1.00 0.19 -0.34 -0.10
Sector
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Permanent Household Survey (EPH), October round; CEP, Secretaría de 
Industria, Comercio y PyME (investment); INTAL, Inter-American Development Bank (imports, exports).   
Note 1: Relative industry-specific skill premia are expressed as deviations from the employment-weighted average 
skill premium for the manufacturing sector (Krueger and Summer, 1988). 
Note 2: GVA=gross value-added 
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Table 2  
Skilled Employment by Manufacturing Sector 
(Percentage of Employees with High School Degree by Sector) 
Argentina 1991, 1996, 2001 
Sector 1991 1996 2001
Food, beverages and tobacco 27.0 29.1 38.7
Textiles and clothing 24.7 30.4 36.4
Leather and footwear 13.6 20.3 18.6
Wood and furniture 19.1 24.2 32.3
Paper 38.8 49.8 44.9
Publishing and printing 33.0 55.3 57.0
Chemicals and petrochemicals 48.2 49.4 63.6
Plastics and rubber products 27.0 30.0 54.0
Non-metallic mineral products 27.5 19.1 29.5
Basic metallic products 22.9 33.1 36.5
Fabricated metallic products 18.2 27.3 39.6
Machinery and equipment 40.3 50.1 47.9
Electrical and electronic equipment 45.5 48.4 58.0
Transportation Vehicles 33.6 41.1 46.8
  
Manufacturing Sector 28.3 34.4 42.8
   
All Sectors 40.3 45.1 50.4
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the Permanent Household Survey 
(EPH), October round. (population weights considered). 
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Table 3 
Models of Industry-Specific Skill Premia for High-School Graduates 
Estimation at the industry level 
Manufacturing Sector, Argentina, 1991-2001 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log (Investment M&E/GVA) t 0.029** 0.029** 0.034** 0.032**  0.016** 0.021** 0.019**
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.009)
log (Investment M&E/GVA) t-1     0.028**    
     (0.012)    
log (Imports/GVA) t  -0.017 -0.014 -0.024  -0.006 0.039 -0.041
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.033)  (0.079) (0.116) (0.127)
log (Imports/GVA) t-1     -0.010    
     (0.020)    
log (Exports/GVA) t   -0.034 -0.027  -0.028 0.057 0.050
   (0.027) (0.031)  (0.040) (0.088) (0.080)
log (Exports/GVA) t-1      -0.029
    (0.033)
log (Skilled/Unskilled Workers) t 0.038 -0.063
 (0.077) (0.075)
log (Male/Female Workers) t 0.006 -0.038
 (0.022) (0.024)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Fixed Effects No No No No No Yes No No
First Differences No No No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 154 154 154 154 154 154 140 140  
Note 1: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
Note 2: Industry-specific skill premia in each year are expressed as deviations from the employment-weighted 
average skill premium for the manufacturing sector of the corresponding year (Krueger and Summer, 1988). 
Note 3: Each sector-year observation is weighted by the inverse of the standard error of the sectorial skill premium 
(Krueger and Summer, 1988). 
Note 3: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis (clustering by industry).  
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Table 4 
Models of Skill Premia for High-School Graduates 
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of the real hourly wage of the main occupation 
Estimation at the individual level (males and females aged 18 to 65, with positive wage earnings) 
Manufacturing Sector, Argentina, 1991-2001 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Accumulation      
      
 Without a high-school degree -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.008*** -0.006***
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
 High-School Graduates -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.003 0.004
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
 College Graduates 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.023***
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Import Penetration      
      
 Without a high-school degree 0.016 0.018 -0.001 -0.056***
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
 High-School Graduates 0.004 0.005 -0.011 -0.062***
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018)
 College Graduates 0.002 0.004 -0.011 -0.056***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020)
Exports     
      
 Without a high-school degree 0.007 -0.008 -0.019
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
 High-School Graduates -0.001 -0.014 -0.023*
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
 College Graduates -0.002 -0.021 -0.027
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 34,091 34,091 34,091 34,091 32,238
Model
 
Note 1: * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
Note 2: The regression also includes demographic controls (education, age, and gender) 
interacted with yearly indicators, as well as year, industry, and regional fixed effects. 
Note 2: Robust Huber-White standard errors in parenthesis (clustering by industry).  
Note 3: Control variables in Column (4) are lagged one period, while control variables in Column 
(5) are lagged two periods.  
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